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Abstract
Existing theories of migration either focus on micro- or macroscopic behavior of populations; that is, either the
average behavior of entire population is modeled directly, or decisions of individuals are modeled directly. In this
work, we seek to bridge these two perspectives by modeling individual agents decisions to migrate while accounting
for the social network structure that binds individuals into a population. Pecuniary considerations combined with
the decisions of peers are the primary elements of the model, being the main driving forces of migration. People
of the home country are modeled as nodes on a small-world network. A dichotomous state is associated with each
node, indicating whether it emigrates to the destination country or it stays in the home country. We characterize
the emigration rate in terms of the relative welfare and population of the home and destination countries. The time
evolution and the steady-state fraction of emigrants are also derived.
I. INTRODUCTION
There exists no prevalent and coherent theory of international migration yet. Examples of notable observations
in this area include existence of ethnic clustering, changes in migration patterns (such as Europe, in the second
half of the 20th century) and occasional overflows of immigration volumes (such as Mexico-US) [14]. This work
considers the structural processes active in emigrant-emanating and immigrant-absorbing countries, and the micro
processes motivating individuals and enhancing mobility.
First efforts to lay a theoretical foundation to study emigration date back to 1889 [1]. Presently, various approaches
are segmented by difference in perspective, level of analysis and theoretical tools. Neoclassical economics on the
macro level reduces migration to wage differentials, whose elimination wipes out the migration flow. It makes labor
markets the driving mechanisms of international migration, which should be focused on to control the in/out-flow
of labor [2]–[5]. This approach is accompanied by equivocal empirical investigations [6], [7].
On the micro level, studies are still mainly based on monetary features, where agents optimize productivity given
their skills and necessary costs. The expected net return at the outset is modeled as follows [8]–[11]
ER(0) =
∫ n
t=0
[
P1(t)P2(t)Yd(t)− P3(t)YO(t)
]
e−rtdt− C(0) (1)
where P1(t) is the probability of evading deportation from the destination country, P2(t) is the employment
probability at the destination, Yd(t) is the average wage there, P3(t) is the employment probability in the home
country, YO(t) is the average earning in the home country, r is the rate of inflation, n is the time horizon, and C(0)
is the value of total migration costs at the outset. Migration goes on as long as the expected net return is positive.
This model is supported by empirical evidence [12]–[14].
Both of the approaches described above fail to capture the topology of the social network people live in. Another
potent factor is the stock of immigrants already present at the destination, providing beneficial network externalities
(the influence of social peers), performing as conduits of information and support, facilitating adjustment to the
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2new place [14], [16]–[19]. This feature is backed by ample empirical evidence [20]–[25]. Network externality and
cascading (or herding) effect are two inevitable elements of the network perspective.
In this contribution we approach migration processes from the perspective of network science. We study the
effect of social influence and wage differentials on the fraction of the population who emigrate. We also introduce a
bias towards the home land, to model the inherent patriotism people usually have, and find its effect on emigration
rates.
II. THE MODEL
To model social interactions within the population of a country, we employ a simple small-world network
model [26]. At first, nodes are configured symmetrically on a circle, and each node is connected to every node
within the proximity of b steps away from it, giving them an initial degree of 2b. Then each pair with distance
more than b is connected with probability p. The expected total number of links is then Nb+ N(N−1−2b)2 p and the
average degree of nodes will be 2b+ Θ(Np). To ensure that the average degree is finite in the limit as N →∞ it
is required that p ∼ 1N .
Each node x is endowed with a state sx(t) ∈ {+1,−1}, indicating whether the node stays in its home country
(+1) or emigrates to the destination country (−1). The states evolve over time according to dynamics which depend
on factors discussed next. At each time step, a node observes the state of the adjacent nodes and finds the fraction
of those that are +1 or −1. Denote the fraction of the entire population who, at t, will stay home (with sx(t) = +1)
by ρ(t); emigrants (with sx(t) = −1) are the other 1− ρ(t) portion. Each node also observes the expected wage in
the home country and the foreign country. Here we consider a simplified case where the wage of a country equals
a characteristic indicator of its national wealth, denoted by G, divided by its population. We denote the population
of the home and destination country by Nh and Nd respectively, and define α
def
= NdNh .
A. Migration Without Patriotic Bias
We first develop a model in which agents make emotionless, rational decisions solely on social interactions and
pecuniary considerations (sometimes referred to as homo economicus), without any bias towards their homeland.
The expected wage per capita for the home country is
w+(t) =
Gh
Nhρ(t)
(2)
and for the destination country it equals
w−(t) =
Gd
Nd +Nh(1− ρ(t)) (3)
If one was to only consider these two criteria (wages in the home and destination countries), the probabilities
corresponding to leaving and staying would become
r+(t) =
w+(t)
w+(t) + w−(t)
=
Gh
Nhρ(t)
Gh
Nhρ(t)
+ GdNd+Nh(1−ρ(t))
=
Gh(α+ 1− ρ(t))
Gh(α+ 1− ρ(t)) +Gdρ(t)
r−(t) =
w−(t)
w+(t) + w−(t)
=
Gd
Nd+Nh(1−ρ(t))
Gh
Nhρ(t)
+ GdNd+Nh(1−ρ(t))
=
Gdρ(t)
Gh(α+ 1− ρ(t)) +Gdρ(t)
(4)
We also wish to model social influence. Let Nx denote the set of neighbors of node x, and let zx = |Nx| denote
the degree of node x. We model social influence in a manner akin to the conventional voter model [28]. Each node
adjusts its decision (in expectation) according to the fraction of neighbors who are staying (i.e., those neighbors
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3y ∈ Nx with sy(t) = +1) and those who are leaving (i.e., sy(t) = −1). The probabilities it assigns to the actions
of staying or going are proportional to these fractions. Combining this with the wage considerations, for node x
we get the following decision probabilities
P{sx(t+ ∆t) = +1} = θ
[∑
y∈Nx δ(sy(t), 1)
zx
]
+ (1− θ)r+(t)
P{sx(t+ ∆t) = −1} = θ
[
1−
∑
y∈Nx δ(sy(t), 1)
zx
]
+ (1− θ)r−(t)
(5)
where θ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter quantifying the weight given to network effects vs. monetary considerations, and
δ(a, b) is equal to unity when the arguments match and is zero otherwise.
We would like to characterize the dynamics of ρ(t). To do this, we study how the average state evolves with
time. The expected value of the state for node x in the next timestep is
E{sx(t+ ∆t)} = (+1)P{sx(t+ ∆t) = +1}+ (−1)P{sx(t+ ∆t) = −1} = 2P{sx(t+ ∆t) = +1} − 1. (6)
Using (5) we get
E{sx(t+ ∆t)} = 2θ
[∑
y∈Nx δ(sy, 1)
zx
]
+ 2(1− θ) Gh(α+ 1− ρ(t))
Gh(α+ 1− ρ(t)) +Gdρ(t) − 1. (7)
Now we need to derive an expression for the first term. Let A denote the adjacency matrix of the network. Then
we have ∑
y∈Nx δ(sy, 1)
zx
=
∑
y 6=x
Axyδ(sy, 1)
zx
. (8)
In the so-called annealed approximation [27], one studies quantities averaged over the ensemble of all graph real-
izations (where the average of some quantity ψ denoted by 〈ψ〉) , and approximates Axyδ(sy,1)zx by 〈
Axy
zx
〉〈δ(sy, 1)〉.
All Aijs are random variables with binary distribution, and the average is over all configurations. We need to
consider two different cases, depending on whether or not x and y are initially within b hops of each other in the
small-world model, before long-range connections are added. If y is one of the 2b initial neighbors of x, then〈
Axy
zx
〉
=
N ′∑
k=0
P{zx = k + 2b}
k + 2b
=
N ′∑
k=0
(
N ′
k
)
pk(1− p)N ′−k
k + 2b
def
= ω, (9)
where N ′ = N−2b−1 is the maximum number of links which may be added, per node, in the small-world model.
If y is not initially linked to x then we have〈
Axy
zx
〉
= p
N ′−1∑
k=0
P{zx = k + 2b+ 1}
k + 2b+ 1
= p
N ′−1∑
k=0
(
N ′−1
k
)
pk(1− p)N ′−k−1
k + 2b+ 1
≡ Ω. (10)
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4As noted in [27], one can express ω as the following integral
ω =
N ′∑
k=0
P{zx = k + 2b}
k + 2b
(11)
=
N ′∑
k=0
(
N ′
k
)
(1− p)N ′−k p
k
k + 2b
(12)
=
1
p2b
N ′∑
k=0
(
N ′
k
)
(1− p)N ′−k p
k+2b
k + 2b
(13)
=
1
p2b
N ′∑
k=0
(
N ′
k
)
(1− p)N ′−k
∫ p
λ=0
dλ λk+2b−1 (14)
=
1
p2b
∫ p
λ=0
dλ λ2b−1
 N ′∑
k=0
(
N ′
k
)
(1− p)N ′−kλk
 (15)
=
1
p2b
∫ p
λ=0
dλ λ2b−1
[
(λ+ 1− p)N ′
]
, (16)
and similarly
Ω =
1
p2b
∫ p
λ=0
dλ λ2b
[
(λ+ 1− p)N ′−1
]
. (17)
Integrating by part gives
ω =
1
p2b
∫ p
λ=0
dλ λ2b−1
[
(λ+ 1− p)N ′
]
(18)
=
1
p2b
[
p2b
2b
− N
′
2b
∫ p
λ=0
dλ λ2b(λ+ 1− p)N ′−1
]
(19)
=
1
2b
− N − 2b− 1
(2b)p2b
∫ p
λ=0
dλ λ2b(λ+ 1− p)N ′−1 (20)
=
1
2b
−
(
N − 2b− 1
2b
)
Ω, (21)
from which it is clear that
2bω + Ω(N − 2b− 1) = 1. (22)
Combining this with (7) we get
2ρ(t+ ∆t)− 1 = 2θρ(t)− 1 + 2(1− θ) Gh(α+ 1− ρ(t))
Gh(α+ 1− ρ(t)) +Gdρ(t) (23)
which leads to the following differential equation for ρ
ρ˙ = (θ − 1)ρ+ (1− θ) Gh(α+ 1− ρ)
Gh(α+ 1− ρ) +Gdρ . (24)
Note that this differential equation is separable, and so its solution is expressed as
(1− θ)t =
∫ ρ(t)
ρ(0)
dρ
[
−ρ+ Gh(α+ 1− ρ)
Gh(α+ 1− ρ) +Gdρ
]−1
(25)
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5The closed form expression for this integral is given by
−1
2
ln
[
(1 + α)Gh(1− ρ(t))− ρ(t)(1− ρ(t))Gh −Gdρ(t)2
−Gd
]
+
α
√
Gh tanh
−1
[
Gh(α+2−2ρ(t))+2Gdρ(t)√
Gh
√
Gh(1+α)2+4(1+α)Gd−Gh(1+2α)
]
− α√Gh tanh−1
[
Ghα+2Gd√
Gh
√
Gh(1+α)2+4(1+α)Gd−Gh(1+2α)
]
√
Gh(1 + α)2 + 4(1 + α)Gd −Gh(1 + 2α)
(26)
which is not very informative. Thus we seek the steady-state solution which can be found by setting the time
derivative equal to zero, which gives
ρ∞
def
= lim
t→∞ ρ(t) =
√
(α+ 2)2 + 4Gh(Gd −Gh)(1 + α)− (α+ 2)
2(Gd −Gh) . (27)
We validate the expressions derived above via simulation. Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium fraction of emigrants
as a function of α for different values of Gd when Gh = 1. Figure 2 shows the expected probability of emigration
as a function of the fraction of those who already migrated.
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Fig. 1: The steady-state fraction of the population who decide to leave (1− ρ∞), as a function of α, for different
values of Gd, when Gh is normalized to unity, and θ = 0.7. There are N = 1000 nodes, with b = 8 and p = 4/N , the
steady-state is acquired after 2000 timesteps. Solid lines and bullets represent theoretical prediction and simulation
results respectively.
B. Migration With Patriotic Bias
Note that so far there is no intrinsic tendency towards “home”, homo-economicus-type agents are in action and
high probabilities are not surprising. For instance, this helps explain why the fraction of nodes emigrating can reach
70% in Figure 1.
To be more realistic, one must account for the disposition against emigrating due to patriotism. We account
for this in a Bayesian manner. Let 1 − γ denote the prior probability of staying at home regardless of social and
August 7, 2018 DRAFT
60 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
fraction of emigrants
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f e
m
ig
at
io
n
 
 
θ=0.1
θ=0.4
θ=0.9
Fig. 2: Emigration probability P{sx(t + ∆t) = −1} as a function of the fraction of those already emigrated,
1− ρ(t), for different values of Gd, when Gh = 1. There are N = 1000 nodes, with b = 8 and p = 4/N .
economic conditions. Incorporating this factor into the model described in the previous section leads to the expected
state dynamics
E{sx(t+ ∆t)} = γ
[
(+1)P{sx(t+ ∆t) = +1}+ (−1)P{sx(t+ ∆t) = −1}
]
+ (1− γ)(+1) (28)
= γ
[
2P{sx(t+ ∆t) = +1} − 1
]
+ 1− γ. (29)
The equation of motion becomes
ρ˙ = (γθ − 1)ρ+ γ(1− θ) Gh(α+ 1− ρ)
Gh(α+ 1− ρ) +Gdρ + 1− γ. (30)
The solution to this differential equation can be found by taking the integral
t =
∫
dρ(t)
(1− γ) + ρ(t)(γθ − 1) + γ(1− θ) Gh(α+1−ρ(t))Gh(α+1−ρ(t))+Gdρ(t)
(31)
which is straightforward but voluminous. One can simplify the above expression when the fraction of emigrants is
very small1 by setting ρ(t) = 1 − , and taking a Taylor series expansion about  = 0 up to second order terms.
Defining 
a ≡ γ(1− θ)
(
Gd
αGh+Gd
)
b ≡ 1− γθ + γ(1−θ)GhGhα+Gd
(
1 + α(Gd−Gh)Ghα+Gd
)
c ≡ γ(1−θ)Gh(Gh−Gd)(α−1)(Ghα+Gd)2
(32)
1According to the CIA World Fact Book, the vast majority of countries have migration rates below 1%.
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2112rank.html
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7we have
t =
1
a
[
− b
2a
2 +
(
b2
3a2
− c
3a
)
3 +O(4)
]
. (33)
Alternatively, the equilibrium emigration fraction is found by solving
(γθ − 1)ρ(t) + γ(1− θ) Gh(α+ 1− ρ(t))
Gh(α+ 1− ρ(t)) +Gdρ(t) + 1− γ = 0 (34)
whose solution is
ρ∞
def
= lim
t→∞ ρ(t) =
−B −√B2 − 4AC
2A
(35)
with 
A ≡ (1− γθ)(Gh −Gd)
B ≡ (α+ 1)Gh(γθ − 1) + (1− γ)(Gd −Gh)− γGh(1− θ)
C ≡ Gh(1 + α)(1− γθ).
(36)
Note that the sign of ρ∞ depends on the sign of A; if Gd > Gh, then ρ∞ > 0 and there is emigration to the
destination country, as one would expect.
The equilibrium fraction of emigrants is depicted in Figures 3 and 4, and the emigration probability with respect
to the fraction of those already done so is given in figure (5), which replicates the one due to network externalities
and herding effect in [17].
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Fig. 3: The fraction of the population who decide to leave, as a function of α, for different values of Gd, when Gh
is normalized to unity, with θ = 0.7, γ = 0.2, N = 1000, b = 8 and p = 4/N . Solid lines and bullets represent
theoretical prediction and simulation results respectively.
Note that in the calculations, the role of p (the connection probability the small-world model) cancelled out. In the
simulations no effect on the emigration fractions was observed by changing p. This peculiarity of the small-world
network coincides with the findings in [27], where the average magnetization is preserved and the correlation length
of the finite graph reaches unity in the steady state, irrespective of the value of p. When there is perfect symmetry
between all nodes, local densities vanish in the long time limit, and the equilibrium fraction of emigrants (or in the
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Fig. 4: The fraction of the population who decide to leave, as a function of α, for different values of θ, when Gh
is normalized to unity, with Gd = 2, γ = 0.2, N = 1000, b = 8 and p = 4/N . Solid lines and bullets represent
theoretical prediction and simulation results respectively.
voter model as in [27], average magnetization) only depends on the total fraction of the emigrants. This suggests
that, in order to further incorporate the structural properties of the society, one must introduce asymmetry between
nodes by construction, that is, enforce hierarchy of influence or stratify the underlying network.
Also note that, in the case of γ = θ = 1 we have the conventional voter model, which only has two absorbing
states; either all nodes end up with s = +1 or with s = −1. Figure 6 represents the probability of al the population
staying in the home country, as a function of those who decided to do so at the outset. Note that the results are
the same for different values of p.
Figures 7a and 7b show the effect of θ on the fraction of emigrants. The network has N = 80 nodes with
connection probability p = 2/N , and all other parameters rather than θ are the same for the two graphs.
III. SUMMARY
Previous models proposed for the emigration process do not take into account the social network structure of
the population. In this paper we have modelled emigration decisions taken by agents interacting over a small-world
network. The first model was merely utility based. The fraction of emigrants were found in terms of the difference in
average wage in the home and destination countries, the population ratio of the population of the two countries, and
the relative importance that nodes give to their personal utility calculations and to imitating the behavior of others.
The second model embodied a default disposition against leaving the homeland, modelling patriotism. Theoretical
predictions were accompanied by simulations. We also found that as long as the nodes are indistinguishable, i.e.
their position and characteristics in the network are identical, then the average emigration rates are independent of
the connection probability in the small-world network. One must introduce hierarchy or other structural asymmetries
in order to study the dependence of the collective behavior on the structural properties of the underlying network.
REFERENCES
[1] E. Ravenstein, “The Laws of Migration”, Journal of Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 52 (1889), pp. 241-305.
August 7, 2018 DRAFT
90 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
fraction of emigrants
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f e
m
ig
ra
tio
n
 
 
θ=0.4
θ=0.5
Fig. 5: Emigration probability , as a function of 1 − ρ(t), the fraction of those already emigrated, for different
values of Gd, when Gh is normalized to unity, with γ = 0.2.
Fig. 6: The fraction of the population who stay in the home country, as a function of those decided to do so at the
outset, for different values of p, the connection probability of the small-world graph.
[2] G. Ranis, J. C. H. Fei, “A Theory of Economic Development”, American Economic Review, Vol. 53 (1961), pp. 533-565.
[3] J. R. Harris, M. P. Todaro, “Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A Two-sector Analysis”, American Economic Review, Vol. 60
(1970), pp. 126-142.
[4] R. Faini, A. Venturini, “Migration and Growth: The Experience of Southern Europe”, CEPR, London (1994).
[5] T. Hatton, J. G. Williamson, “Latecomers to Mass Emigration”, The Migration and the International Labor Market 1850-1939, Routledge,
London (1994)
[6] P. Lundborg, “Determinants of Migration in the Nordic Labor Market”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 93 (1991), pp. 363-375.
[7] G. S. Fields, “Place-to-place Migration: Some New Evidence”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 61 (1991), pp. 21-32.
[8] L. Sjaastad, “The Costs and Returns of Human Migration”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 70, N. 5 (1962), pp. S80-S93.
[9] M. P. Todaro, “A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less-developed Countries”, The American Economic Review,
Vol. 59 (1969), pp. 138-148.
[10] T. Hatton, J. G. Williamson, “What Fundamentals Drive World Migration?”, NBER Working Paper No. 9159 (2002).
August 7, 2018 DRAFT
10
(a) θ = 0.2 (b) θ = 0.8
Fig. 7: The small-world graph in the steady-state. Green nodes are the emigrants and black nodes are those who
stay in the home country. N = 80, p = 2N , γ = 0.7, G2 = 2 and α = 1.5. For the graph on the left, the value of
θ is set to 0.2, and for the one on the right, it is set to 0.8.
[11] D. S. Massey et al. , “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal”, Population and Development Review, Vol. 19, N. 3
(1993), pp. 431-466.
[12] S. Bowles, “Migration as Investment: Empirical Tests of the Human Investment Approach to Geographical Mobility”, The Review of
Economics and Statistics, Vol. 52 (1970), pp. 356-362.
[13] T. Straubhaar, “On the Economics of International Migration”, Verlag Paul Haupt, Bern (1988).
[14] D. S. Massey, F. G. Espana, “The Social Process of International Migration”, Science, Vol. 237, N. 4816 (1987), pp. 733-738.
[15] G. S. Epstein, A. L. Hilmann, “Herd Effects and Migration”, DEPR Discussion Paper No. 1811, London.
[16] T. Darvish-Lecker, “Externalities in Migration”, Economic Letters Vol. 33, Is. 2 (1990), pp. 185-191.
[17] T. Bauer, G. Epstein, I. B. Gang, “Herd Effects or Migration Networks? The Location Choice of Mexican Immigrants in the US”, IZA
Discussion Paper No. 551 (2002)
[18] G. S. Epstein, “Informal Cascades and Decision to Migrate”, IZA Working Paper, No. 445 (2002).
[19] S. Haung, “Migration Networks and Migration Decision-Making”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (2008), pp.
585-605.
[20] K. Munshi, “Identification of Network Effects: Mexican Migrants in the US Labor Market”, NEUDC Conference, Boston (2001).
[21] T. Bauer, G. Epstein, I. B. Gang, “What are Migration Networks?”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 200 (2000).
[22] P. J. Pedersen, M. Pytlikova, N. Smith, “Selection or Network Effects? Migration Flows into 27 OECD Countries, 1990-2000”, IZA
Discussion Paper, N0. 1104.
[23] J. A. Dunlevy, “On the Settlement Patterns of Recent Carribean and LAtin Immigrants to the United States”, Growth and Change, Vol.
22, Is. 1 (1991), pp. 54-67.
[24] D. A. Jaeger, “Local Labor Markets, Admission Categories, and Immigrant Location Choice”, Hunter College and Graduate School CUNY
Working Paper (2000).
[25] D. McKenzie, “Self-Selection Patterns in Mexico-U.S Migration: The Role of Migration Networks”, The Review of Economics and
Statistics, Vol. 92, No. 4 (2010), pp. 811-821.
[26] D. J. Watts, H. Strogatz, “Collective Dynamics of ’Small-world’ Networks”, Nature Vol. 393, pp. 440-442 (1998)
[27] D. Vilone, C. Castellano, “Solution of Voter Model Dynamics on Annealed Small-world Networks, Physical Review E, V. 69, Is. 1 (2004)
[28] T. M. Liggett, “Interacting Particle Systems”, Springer Verlag, New York, 2005.
August 7, 2018 DRAFT
